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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Scope

This memorandum explores the question of whether political pressure on the judiciary
must always amount to political interference.* It examines the foundations of judicial impartiality
from a practical framework, exploring methods of analysis to determine the presence of an
improper interference with judicial processes adopted through resolutions, treaties, and working
groups around the world, as well as the domestic courts of the United States. The memorandum
analyzes several cases from international tribunals to explore judicial independence in
international context, including the Furundzija Appellate decision of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the Special Court for Sierra Leone in the trial of Sam Hinga
Norman, the Iraqi High Tribunal in the Al Dujail case, and Timor-Leste’s Special Panels of the
Dili District Court, which have all encountered accusations of political interference.
B.

Summary of Conclusions
i.

Difference between political pressure and political interference is a
terminological distinction without a difference; both are used to
describe breaches of the more important concept, judicial
independence.

ii.

“Perfect” Judicial Independence, free from all extraneous
influences, may not be necessary for the guarantees of international
due process under Furundzija, but appearance of bias is problematic
in proceedings and public perception.

iii.

Allegations of direct executive interference are not analogous to
the IHT judge resignations, but instead reinforce questions of
apparent bias.

*

“Political pressure on the judiciary is often argued as political interference in the court process in legal
terms. Provide examples of cases where political pressure was not to amount to political interference in the
judicial process. Can a clear distinction be made between the two concepts of political pressure and
political interference?”

11

II.

iv.

Statements by Cambodian Government Officials may be enough
to cause an appearance of impropriety under the Furundzija test.

v.

Judicial Interference from the Cambodian co-investigatory judge
You Bunleng may appear improper as a violation of independence
among judicial colleagues, it is most accurately framed as political
interference from the executive.

vi.

ECCC funding mechanism is not likely a violation of Judicial
Independence since the contribution by the Cambodian Government
is so small a percentage of total Tribunal funding.

BACKGROUND
Since November 2011, two judges have resigned from the Extraordinary Chambers in the

Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”) under the shadow of political interference in the tribunal.1 The
allegations have centered around government response to two cases known as “Case 003” and
Case “004,” which were opened in 2009, and focus on mid-level members of the former Khmer
Rouge regime whose identities remain officially unannounced.2
In April 2011, the Co-investigating Judge Sigfried Blunk closed Case 003 following
public comments by the Cambodian Minster of Information that “if they [the tribunal] want to go
into Case 003 and 004, they should just pack their bags and leave,” while the Prime Minister had
stated the cases “will not be allowed.”3 Further undermining the role of the international

1

For a general, though critical, examination of the back story, see generally Stephanie Giry, Necessary Scapegoats?
The Making of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal, NY REV. BOOKS, Jul. 23, 2012,
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/jul/23/necessary-scapegoats-khmer-rouge-tribunal/ (last visited Nov.
20, 2013) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 46].
2

See, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, CASE 003, (“The identity of the two suspects in
Case 003 remains confidential.”), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/286 [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 16]; and EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA,
CASE 004, (“Thus far, no persons have been charged and the identity of the three suspects remains confidential.”),
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/case/topic/98 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 17].
3

Press Release, Statement by the International Co-Investigating Judge, Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/statement-international-co-investigating-judge (last
visited Dec. 1, 2013) (hereinafter “Blunk Resignation Statement”) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
flash drive at Source 18].
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Tribunal, the Cambodian Foreign Minister also stated “On the issue of the arrest of more Khmer
Rouge leaders, this is a Cambodian issue… This issue must be decided by Cambodia.”4 In
October, Judge Blunk announced his resignation from the Tribunal citing political interference
from the Cambodian government.5 In the press release announcing his resignation, Judge Blunk
stated that although he “will not let himself be influenced by such statements, his ability to
withstand such pressure by Government officials and to perform his duties independently, could
always be called in doubt, and this would also call in doubt the integrity of the whole
proceedings in Cases 003 and 004.”6
His successor, Judge Laurent Kasper-Ansermet, resigned his post less than half a year
later. Although he reopened Case 003, Judge Kasper-Ansermet claims he encountered “active
opposition” to the continued investigation of cases 003 and 004 by his Cambodian coinvestigative counterpart, You Bunleng, which forced his resignation.7
Problems at the ECCC, or at least the perception of them, have persisted: the Cambodian
government had been criticized for its extra-constitutional role in the selection and disciplining
of judges in the normal court system.8 In addition, in September 2012, the Supreme Chambers

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7

Press Release, Press Release from the International Reserve Co-Investigating Judge, Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia (Mar. 19, 2011), http://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/articles/press-release-international-reserve-coinvestigating-judge (last visited Nov. 6, 2013) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at
Source 19].
8

A 2006 U.N. report found that of the judicial selection & disciplining committee, the SCM, to be heavily entwined
with government. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Human Rights in Cambodia, Yash Ghai, (E/CN.4/2006/110), para. 16, Jan. 26, 2006, (“all members but one belong
to the Cambodian People’s Party, and two members are on its Central Committee”) [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 47].
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had to address potential for bias stemming from statements by the Prime Minister Hun Sen that it
believed had the “potential” to prejudice the accused right to a fair trial, or at very least make the
tribunal appear beholden to the government.9
This motion was one of several made under Rule 35 by Nuon Chea, one of the defendants
of Case 002.10 Rule 35, among other things, bars improper interference in the Tribunal by
outside sources,11 and is complemented by Rule 34(1), which concerns itself with the
appearance of bias.12 It states: “A judge may recuse him/herself in any case in which … the
Judge has, or has had, an association which objectively might affect his or her impartiality, or
objectively give rise to the appearance of bias.”13 These two rules are bolstered by the original
United Nations-Cambodia Agreement which stipulates that judges and prosecutors shall be of
“high moral character, impartiality and integrity … be independent in the performance of their
functions and shall not accept or seek instructions from any Government or any other source.”14
Yet, in practice, the Tribunal has been beset by allegations that it has failed to live up to this
9

NUON Chea, Case File No. 002/19/09-2007-ECCC-TC/SC(15), Decision on Nuon Chea’s Appeal against the Trial
Chamber’s Decision on Rule 35 Applications for Summary Action, Sept. 14, 2012, Doc. No. E176/2/1/4, para. 68
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 29].
10

See also, NUON Chea, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on Rule 35 Request Calling for
Summary Action Against Minister of Foreign Affairs Hor Namhong, Nov. 11, 2012, Doc. No. E219/3 [Electronic
copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 30]; NUON Chea, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007/ECCC,
Decision on Nuon Chea Motions Regarding Fairness of Judicial Investigation, Sept. 9, 2011, Doc. No. E116
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 31].
11

Internal Rules of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 2011 (Rev. 8), Rule 35 (hereinafter
“ECCC Internal Rules”) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 8].
12

Id.., Rule 34.

13

Id.

14

Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution
Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea, Res. 57/228, Dec. 18,
2002, Art. 9 (3) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 10].
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language. In the future, the actions of the Cambodian Government and the judicial response to
them could prove the future basis of challenges to the independence of the ECCC, both in and
outside the Extraordinary Chambers.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS
A.

Treaties, Principles, Theory, and Comparative Jurisprudence on Judicial
Independence
i. International treaties, resolutions and adopted principles
The necessity of an independent judiciary has long been recognized by judiciaries

domestic and international in character. One of the cornerstones of modern international law, the
UN Declaration of Human Rights, declares in Article 10 “Everyone is entitled in full equality to
a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal” (emphasis added),15 a call
echoed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states, similarly
“everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”16
Since then, the international community has grappled with defining an “independent and
impartial” tribunal. In 1982, the International Bar Association proffered its take on the concept,
publishing the “IBA Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence” (“IBA Standards”).17
Organized by separately defining Executive Interference, Legislative Interference, Media
Interference, and impermissible conduct by Judges themselves, the IBA Standards provided a
comprehensive examination of what could constitute or appear to constitute political interference
15

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948)
[Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 4].
16

International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, Art. 14(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [Electronic copy
provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 1]..
17

INT’L BAR ASSOC., MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1982) [Electronic copy provided in
accompanying USB flash drive at Source 12].

15

in the functions of an independent judiciary. Notably, the IBA explicitly denounces executive
interference, stating: “The ministers of the government shall not exercise any form of pressure on
judges, whether overt or covert, and shall not make statements which adversely affect the
independence of individual judges or of the Judiciary as a whole.”18 Equally important, however,
is that the IBA Standards extend to the perception of impropriety as well as covering actual
interference. They state: “a judge shall not sit in a case where there is a reasonable suspicion of
bias or potential bias,”19 and, “a judge shall avoid any course of conduct which might give rise to
an appearance of partiality.”20
In 1985, the UN adopted the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary
(“UN Basic Principles”).21 It is similar in many ways to the IBA Standards: it protects against
ad hoc tribunals,22 guarantees the tenure and compensation of judges,23 guarantees provision of
adequate resources for the courts,24 and most significantly, it provides that “judiciary shall decide
matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any
restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.”25 This is, to date, the only resolution on the
independence of the judiciary adopted by the General Assembly.

18

Id., para. 16.

19

Id., para. 44.

20

Id., para. 45.

21

U.N. Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, G.A. Res. 40/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/32 (Nov. 29,
1985) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 3].
22

Id., para. 5.

23

Id., paras. 11-13.

24

Id., para. 7.

25

Id., para. 2.
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Yet development of the principles of judicial independence did not stop with the UN
Basic Principles: these previous efforts at codification laid the foundations for the 2002
Bangalore Principles on Judicial Conduct (“Bangalore Principles”).26 The Bangalore Principles
provide the most thorough codification yet of international expectations of judicial
independence. They have been adopted directly by the American Bar Association27 and the UN
Economic and Social Council,28 while the UN Office of Drugs and Crime and the UN Judicial
Integrity Group has published commentaries extrapolating on the Bangalore Principles.29
The Bangalore Principles are organized into six “Values:” Independence, Impartiality,
Integrity, Propriety, Equality, and Competence and Diligence,30 which are explained in both
principle and application. The values create a comprehensive framework for evaluating the
conduct of judges, but it is the first value in particular, Independence, which deals specifically
with the conduct of organizations outside the judicial body. In many respects the Bangalore
Principles resemble the U.N. Basic Principles but for several crucial distinction, such as in the
first “application” of the value: “A judge shall exercise the judicial function independently on the
basis of the judge’s assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding
of the law, free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference,

26

Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct (2002) (hereinafter
“Bangalore Principles”) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 13].
27

AM. BAR. ASSOC. Res. Supporting the Adoption of U.N. Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,
International Bar Association Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, and the Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct, Aug. 13, 2007 [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB flash drive at Source 14].
28

E.S.C. Res. 2006/23, U.N. Doc. E/RES/2006/23 (July 27, 2006) [Electronic copy provided in accompanying USB
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direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason” (emphasis added).31 The paragraph echoes
almost exactly the UN Basic Principle on the same topic, but the addition of the term
“extraneous” ensures that there is a noted difference between those influences acceptable and
proper, such as amicus briefs by government agencies, and those that are improper because they
emerge from a non-judicial context.
The Bangalore Principles also codified and emphasizing the importance of public
perception, stating “a judge shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and
influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to a
reasonable observer to be free therefrom,”32 and that the appearance of independence is
necessary to “reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence.”33 An equally important development was the inclusion of
Principle 1.4, which states a judge must be “independent of judicial colleagues in respect to
decisions that the judge is obliged to make independently.”34 The weakness of the Bangalore
Principles, however is that they are “judge facing:” all of the principles stated therein are related
to judicial conduct, and do not explicitly address the expectations of external actors in the way
the UN Basic Principles had.
The Bangalore Principles, while widely accepted by institutions internationally, leave
themselves to implementation by national judiciaries,35 and have not been adopted by the
General Assembly. Thus, other organizations have continued to promote judicial independence
31
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by creation and development of standards of their own, as in the recently developed Mount
Scopus International Standards of Judicial Independence (“Mt. Scopus Standards”),36 created by
the International Association of Judicial Independence and World Peace in 2008.
Like the IBA Standards and UN Basic Principles, the Mt. Scopus standards address the
society and government in which the judiciary resides as well as the conduct of the judges
themselves, but the Mt. Scopus Standards are special for directly addressing the independence of
the international judiciary in addition to domestic courts. The Mt. Scopus Standards contain
novel guidelines tailored for international jurists, such as addressing the security of tenure of the
judges (suggested to be for long term contracts, with difficulty in removal),37 that international
jurists should be given Diplomatic Immunity,38 and the Budget of the Tribunal, which the
Standards merely suggested be “adequate” for the proper functioning of the court.39
ii.

American Case Law:

Although by no means dispositive in the international context, American constitutional
law presents an additional novel viewpoint of judicial independence. American courts have
presented questions of judicial independence not as a question of whether the separation of
powers have been violated, but whether the impartiality of the decision maker has been
compromised, thus violating a petitioner’s right to a fair trial.

36
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The Supreme Court of the United States has found the violations of judicial impartiality
to be an unconstitutional breach of the substantive due process due under the 14th Amendment
rather than a “separation of powers” violation.40 The Court explained: "the neutrality
requirement helps to guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an
erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the law… At the same time, it preserves both the
appearance and reality of fairness . . . by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests
in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is
not predisposed to find against him."41
Most often applied to arbiters falling outside of the scope of Article 3,42 the existing case
law predominantly concerns questions of recusal,43 or some variety of self-dealing.44 There is a
distinct lack of jurisprudence on when political pressure may run afoul of the Constitution’s
guarantee of due process. However, the Supreme Court, in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal, the
leading case on the matter, stated broadly that “most matters relating to judicial disqualification
40
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[do] not rise to a constitutional level,”45 and that “personal bias or prejudice” alone is
insufficient to raise a constitutional concern.46 Yet, in the rare cases raising a substantive
question of impartiality is raised, the Court states it must be examined with an objective
standard: “The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the
average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional
‘potential for bias.’”47
Thus, while American Constitutional Law provides limited specific guidance of under
what circumstances political pressure itself may violate the due process of law, it does provide a
helpful framework of analysis suitable for supplementing the analysis of the problems faced by
international tribunals.
B.

The Experience of International Tribunals
i.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The
Furundzija Appeal

The most notable case in international law on judicial impropriety emerged from the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in the Furundzija appeal.48
The decision rested on the dual requirements of judicial impartiality and the right to a fair trial
enshrined in the ICTY’s establishing statute,49 which provided the basis for the defendant’s
appeal. The defendant asserted that a Judge in the trial chamber, while admittedly not actually
45
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biased, had given the appearance of bias, and therefore violated his duty of impartiality by being
involved with the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, which had filed an amicus curae
brief for the prosecutor in the case against the defendant.
The Appeals court relied on European Court of Human Rights rulings to outline the scope
of the requirement of impartiality, holding first that the test is objective, but objective for the
purposes of demonstrating actual or apparent bias. They explain “a tribunal is not only
genuinely impartial, but also appears to be impartial. Even if there is no suggestion of actual
bias, where appearances may give rise to doubts about impartiality, the Court has found that this
alone may amount to an inadmissible jeopardy of the confidence which the Court must inspire in
a democratic society.”50
Utilizing jurisprudence from both civil and common law countries, the court found in
interpreting the impartiality requirement, the guiding test should be first, whether there is actual
bias, which renders a judge not impartial, and second, whether there is the impermissible
appearance of bias. For fair trial purposes, there is the appearance of bias if the judge has either
an interest in the outcome of the case, or “the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer,
properly informed, to reasonably apprehend bias.”51 The properly informed observer, the court
held to be necessary, stating they must be thought of to have “knowledge of all the relevant
circumstances, including the traditions of integrity and impartiality that form a part of the
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background and apprised also of the fact that impartiality is one of the duties that Judges swear
to uphold.”52
The defendant conceded that the trial judge was not actually biased, and thus the appeals
court applied the “reasonable observer, properly informed” test, and found first that with the
presumption of impartiality in favor of the judge.53 Furthermore, in her role with the U.N.
Commission, the judge acted as an agent of her country, while in her role as a judge for the
ICTY she acted in an individual capacity, thus the two could be compartmentalized to a degree.54
Finally, because the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women existed to promote established
judicial principles such as prosecution of rape as a war crime, and promote human rights
advocated by the United Nations generally, even if her role were not attenuated from the
organization, the judge could not be held impermissibly biased for promoting the rule of law as it
is accepted internationally.55
ii.

Special Court for Sierra Leone: Norman Case

In the trial of Sam Norman, in Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of
Jurisdiction (Judicial Independence),56 the Special Court for Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) addressed
questions of Judicial Independence raised by the Defendant Sam Hinga Norman. Norman had
argued that the independence and impartiality of the Court were compromised by the unique
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financing mechanism of the SCSL, whereby international donor countries and organizations
would finance the court on a voluntary basis.57 Under Article 7 of the SCSL Agreement, these
donor countries would also appoint members to a “Management Committee,” which would assist
in raising money and provide non judicial “advice and policy direction.”58
Norman reasoned that since the SCSL was financed by voluntary contributions,
international donors could exert pressure on the court via threats, explicit or implicit, to withdraw
funding if “correct” verdicts were not rendered.59 Furthermore, he argued that through their
contributions which allowed for placement of agents on the Management Committee, donors
could again exercise improper influence through that organ.60 Since under Rule 13(1) and 15,
judges of the SCSL were expected to be independent “in the performance of their functions”61
and “impartial,”62 Norman asserted these pressures would compromise that independence
guaranteed by the operating rules.
The court rejected these assertions and ruled for the prosecution, finding that the funding
arrangement did not compromise the independence of the judiciary. The court looked to
traditions of judicial independence that, at least in the Anglo-common law tradition, date to the
Stuart kings of England in the early 18th Century,63 but relied primarily on recent cases from the
57
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English,64 Canadian65 and American tradition,66 in determining that the independence of the
SCSL was not compromised. The court found that there was no factual basis for the defense’s
allegations, dismissing assertions that the judge’s salaries were implicitly tied to the continued
funding of the tribunal, since the judges receive salaries fixed by an ongoing contract.67
Furthermore, the court starkly criticized assertion that the donor states of the international
community would act with the outright hypocrisy of promoting the rule of law, due process, and
judicial independence in their domestic courts and internationally, but would not do so in a
tribunal they fund.68 Finally, the court rejected the concept that the Management Committee
might somehow exert undue influence on the judiciary since it has no powers or influence over
the SCSL akin to an executive or legislative branch.69
In his concurring opinion, Justice Robertson noted in particular that the funding
mechanism issue needed to be addressed by the court, since it did differ from the ICTR and
ICTY and thus presented a novel question worth addressing.70 He found, however, that though
these provide models, so long as there are no unbalanced incentives towards one party or
another, the exact funding mechanism does not matter.71 He also placed a heavy emphasis on the
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objective perception of impartiality and independence72 that ought to characterize any court, but
especially an international tribunal.73 After resolving this issue in court, the SCSL has been
largely free from accusations of compromised independence.
iii.

The Iraqi High Tribunal: The Al Dujail Trial

The Dujail trial of the Iraqi High Tribunal serves as another case study of compromised
judicial independence through political interference.74 The trial has attracted significant
criticism from several fronts,75 some aimed at the tribunal’s retention of the death penalty76 and
the deteriorating security situation which led to the deaths of several attorneys involved in the
case,77 but most significantly for the present analysis are the failure to provide due process in
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line with international norms, particularly due to accusations that the court was hampered by
political interference.78
The Dujail Trial was the trial of Saddam Hussein and seven co defendants for the torture,
murder, and destruction of livelihoods of the residents of the small town of Dujail, Iraq following
an assassination attempt against Saddam in 1982.79 It was tried by the Iraqi High Tribunal
(“IHT”), an Iraqi domestic tribunal first established under the occupation of the American-led
coalition government, and later ratified by an act of the Iraqi National Assembly.80 The IHT was
specifically tasked with investigating international human rights violations in Iraq between 1968
and 2003. The IHT is one example of what Professor Michael Scharf81 has called a “new breed
of domestic [tribunals] that combine elements of international and domestic war crimes
courts.”82 It is comprised entirely of Iraqi judges and exercised an Iraqi adaptation of
international law, though administratively it was still largely ran by the Americans, who
provided most of the financing, handled and secured the evidence, and administered training and
advising along with international jurists. Additionally, the trial was conducted under the security
of Coalition forces in the “Green Zone” in Baghdad.83
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Alleged political interference in the IHT took two distinct forms during the Dujail trial.
The first, more easily recognized as a compromise of judicial independence, was the public
political pressure exerted by the executive branch upon the judiciary. At numerous points in the
trial, members of the executive publicly proclaimed their expectations or desires of the court.84
One notable example of this pressure occurred after the conclusion of the trial, while the appeal
was still being decided, when Prime Minister Maliki stated he hoped to have hung Saddam
before the start of the new year.85 This expectation was, at the time, considered unrealistic,86 but
the Court of Cassation returned a judgment on the appeal faster than most analysts had
expected,87 which did allow the execution to occur on December 30, 2006. This timely return of
judgment, combined with the dubious quality of the legal analysis by the appellate court,88
created the perception, real or perceived, that Maliki’s statements had exerted influence upon the
inner workings of the judiciary.89
The International Council for Transitional Justice,90 in their analysis of the Dujail trial,
noted that “other remarks by political leaders have eroded the presumption of innocence and
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given the impression that the trials are a foregone conclusion. It is difficult to think of a more
blatant attack on the independence of the judiciary.”91
Yet some have alleged that control of the judiciary in both appointment and removal has
been one such blatant attack. M. Cherif Bassiouni92 notes the irony that judicial appointments to
the IHT were made by the unelected governing council, a distinctly political organ, in an
unaccountable and opaque manner that mirrored the Ba’athist selection of judges of the previous
regime.93 As expressed by Mr. Bassiouni, this raised concerns of the independence of those
judges from the organ and politicians who appointed them. However, by the end of the trial, it
would be concerns over the removal power of political organs that would come to be the primary
concern of observers.
For instance, Judge Amin, the original presiding judge over the trial, resigned supposedly
“following criticism of his courtroom demeanor by senior political figures and the public.”94
Eventually 4 of the original 5 judges would resign or retire throughout the course of the trial,95
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including Saeed al-Hammashi, the replacement for Judge Amin, who soon fell victim to the DeBa’athification Commission and was removed from the Trial Chamber.96
This latter removal of Saeed al-Hammashi exemplifies the more invidious tool of the
executive when exercising power over the nominally independent Iraqi High Tribunal: the DeBa’athification regime. The executive consistently used it to remove judges whose rulings or
attitudes appeared out of line with their preferences.97 In the Statute establishing the IHT,
former Ba’ath party members are disqualified from serving on the Tribunal.98 This is impractical
for Iraq, however, given that Ba’ath Party Membership was required for all judges in the Saddam
regime.99 Thus, for the Tribunal to have any previous judicial expertise and still retain its Iraqi
character, it must accept judges who were former Ba’ath party members.100 In practice, this led
to the De-Ba’athification Group, controlled by the executive, to have the ability to dismiss judges
at whim.
Sissons and Bassin,101 for example, recount that in 2005, the Commission attempted to
remove 19 court personnel under the De-Ba’athification procedures to partial success. This, they
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note resulted in a threat from the US to relocate the tribunal.102 However, with the DeBa’athification sword overhanging the heads of the judges, the effects may not always be so
obvious as outright removal. Sissons and Bassin believe this resulted in several judges modifying
their behavior, refusing positions of prominence, or not standing for reelection.103 This fear was
supported by Reports from both the International Center for Transitional Justice,104 and Human
Rights Watch.105 This analysis was bolstered by a secret cable from the U.S. Embassy in
Baghdad which acknowledged this potential for abuse of the De-Ba’athification commission,
citing the threatened dismissal of 13 judges by Achmed Chalaibi in 2005.106
There were other problems with the administration of justice in Iraq. In addition to the
influence exerted by public statements and the De-Ba’athification commission, the Prime
Minister’s office held control over the judicial salaries and provision of secure accommodations
in the Green Zone, which in the deteriorating security environment of Baghdad, was undoubtedly
influential.107 The threats to judicial independence were not only Executive in origin, however.
In an exercise reminiscent of Clark’s study of legislative influence on judicial decision making
via “court curbing,” the American Embassy in Baghdad feared that the Iraqi National Assembly
102
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may attempt to curtail the independence of the IHT by granting normal judiciary appellate power
over the IHT’s decisions, or at very least, threaten to change the appellate rules so as to influence
the Tribunal.108
Not all analyses are so sharply critical, however. Newton and Scharf, in their 2008 book
on the Dujail Trial posit that many of these fears were more theoretical than applied, reflecting
more sensationalism in the media than in the politicization of the trial itself.109 For example,
although the trial was occasionally construed as a missed opportunity to prosecute Saddam for
much greater crimes such as the Anfal and Southern Marsh campaigns, Newton & Scharf explain
that “once the investigative judge finds a prima facie case against a defendant, the individual
must be brought to justice for those crimes.”110 They beg the critics be fair, and recognize the the
ambit and full effect of the Dujail trial- it represented a radical attempt to integrate international
legal standards into the Middle Eastern legal tradition, in a tragically violent environment, while
many of the perceived problems they ascribe to the defense’s disruptive tactics more than actual
due process failures.111
Yet ultimately, the experience of the Iraqi High Tribunal exemplifies many of the
possible means of exerting political pressure to control the decisions of a judiciary in ways that
do raise strong concerns of due process violations. In an interesting parallel with the questionable
independence of the IHT, one of the defendants, Awwad Hamad Al-Bandar, the judge of the
Revolutionary Court who issued the guilty verdicts and prescribed the death penalty to the
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residents of Al-Dujail, was held responsible for the killings because his court had effectively
rubber stamped the cases before it. His judicial independence was so compromised he was acting
less in response to political pressure than directly acting as the arm of the executive branch. The
appeals court stated: “This evidence supports the conclusion that he was an executive employee
for the regime, carrying out the duties of his job, without being an independent judge of the court
deciding the fate of innocent people.”112
In the Dujail trial, there was nothing so radical. Although public statements of the
executive branch may or may not have had a serious effect on the performance of judges, at least
in the case of the execution expectation statement by Maliki in 2006, they had the effect of
creating the perception of a kowtowing judiciary, damaging the reputation of the tribunal and the
expectations of justice from the public. Furthermore, the De-Ba’athification procedures use to
mold the composition of the judiciary were an example of political interference in the
functioning of the judiciary.
Finally, and perhaps most significant to the lasting impression of the Dujail trial, was the
IHT’s failure to address these concerns. Regarding the security situation which had caused the
death of several defense attorneys and court personnel, the court merely brushed off concerns,
saying “however, and despite all these infringing behaviors that violate the rules and regulations
of the procedures in courts, it doesn’t affect neither the transparency of the court procedures nor
its credibility in the course of the lawsuit according to the reasonable procedural rules.”113 In
the end, this attitude may have done more harm than either the assassinations or the DeBa’athification commission.
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iv.

The East Timor Tribunal

As was the case of the Iraqi High Tribunal, the U.N. created Special Panels of the Dili
District Court (“East Timor Tribunal”) was a unique mix of domestic and international elements.
Yet, where the Americans, who funded, aided, and advised the IHT, made every attempt to
remove themselves from the actual trial, the UN more formally embraced its role as an
administrator of justice. The East Timor Tribunal was part of the UN Transitional Administration
in East Timor (UNTAET),114 the administration that bridged the period between the end of
Indonesian occupation in 1999 and formal Independence in 2002, and was tasked specifically
with trying cases of “serious criminal offences” which took place during the independence
referendum of 1999 and resulted in approximately 1,400 murders and the displacement and
forced deportation of over 200,000 people.115 As custodians of a new state freshly emerging
from colonialism and occupation, UNTAET and the East Timor Tribunal had a dual focus on
both the administration of justice and capacity building of the East Timor State and its judicial
system.116 In accordance with those dual aims, the Special Panels were each comprised of three
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judges, with two international jurists to each Timorese.117 The Panels sat in the East Timorese
capital, Dili, and were nominally a part of the Dili District Court.118
Despite these structural attempts to build capacity of an independent judiciary using the
Tribunal, according to most analysts, the UNTAET is mostly seen as a failure in both the
promotion of justice and in building capacity, leaving behind only a judicial system beholden to
the executive powers, consequently denying justice for the victims both during the East Timor
Tribunal and after its closure in 2005.119 In large measure this result can be ascribed to the
failure to pursue any contentious senior, and importantly, international, suspects in the crucial
first two years of the Tribunal.120 These cases were left to prosecute after full independence was
attained in 2002, which would effectively scuttle future prosecutions due to, among other things,
a lack of judicial independence.
Unlike in Iraq where judicial independence was compromised as a means of sectarian
retribution through the judiciary, in East Timor, the cause was precisely the opposite. According
to Padraig McAuliffe,121 David Cohen,122 and Caitlin Reiger and Marieke Weirda,123 in
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pursuit of “normalizing” relations with Indonesia, the East Timorese executive stifled the Office
of the Prosecutor in attempts to pursue charges against Indonesian officials who were suspected
of committing or ordering the human rights violations that occurred during the transition period
in 1999. In fact, although there were serious international due process violations in some of the
83 convictions of the Tribunal,124 including inequality of arms, inadequate translation, victim
protection, and convictions for crimes for which the accused was not tried, there appear to be no
accusations of political pressure or compromises of the independence of the judiciary in these
lower level cases.125 Such compromises were restricted to more consequential and influential
indictees, the clearest example of which was the indictment of General Wiranto.
In 2003, the East Timor Tribunal issued an indictment for General Wiranto, the officer in
command of the Indonesian Armed Forces during the violence in 1999, and seven other high
level Indonesian military figures. President Gusmao of East Timor immediately stated his
priorities that would define the executive’s relations with the Tribunal for the rest of its
existence: “relations with Indonesia are of extreme importance, not only for current stability, but
for the future of the country.”126 Soon after, presumably due to pressure exerted by the
President, according to Reiger and Weirda, the Prosecutor General backed off his own
indictment.127 In May of 2004, this indictment was followed by an arrest warrant, however, it
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was never submitted to Interpol, nor acted upon. In fact, President Gusmao, only weeks after the
warrant was issued, met General Wiranto in Bali, and in a physical rebuff of the independent
judiciary, embraced him.128
Unfortunately, this practice of executive meddling did not end with the Wiranto case or
even the rule of President Gusmao. Explicit interference in the role of the judiciary would also
occur in his successor’s reign, during the investigation of the 2006 violence that rocked the
country, and following the 2008 assassination attempts on the President and Prime Minister. By
exercising restraint of the prosecution via formal and informal control over prosecutorial
decisions, and making liberal use of the pardon, the executive exercises an impressive, and
procedurally troubling, amount of control over the judicial process. Following the 2006 Crisis, of
the 60 investigations launched, McAuliffe notes that “not a single individual remains in detention
after nine pardoned convictions and 43 acquittals.”129 Furthermore, he fears that the
unlikelihood of the sentence being carried through has further discouraged judges and
prosecutors from properly pursuing cases.130 This was highlighted when the judge hearing the
appeals of the assassination case had to take the step of requesting the president to hold his
pardon until after the appeal was heard.131
In 2010, in what amounted to an admission of the dire status of judicial independence in East
Timor, the President requested an international tribunal to handle matters in lieu of domestic
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courts.132 Timor-Leste continues to struggle with a culture of corruption wrapped in the
language of reconciliation. In contrast to the fears of political interference in the judiciary
curtailing American or international concepts of due process as exemplified in the Iraqi High
Tribunal, the East Timor experience exemplifies judicial interference that can curtail the
administration of justice itself, denying victims their rights and allowing perpetrators to walk
free.
C.

ECCC and Judicial Independence in Context
i.

Difference between political pressure and political interference is a
terminological distinction without a difference; both are used to describe
breaches of the more important concept, judicial independence.

Functionally, there appears no practical distinction between political pressure and political
interference. Academically, the focus of research has been on what constitutes judicial
independence, and the line of line of impropriety between political pressure and political
interference appears to be crossed when this nebulous concept is violated. According to the
Bangalore Principles, in order to achieve independence, judges should be free from “free of any
extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interference, direct or indirect, from
any quarter or for any reason” (emphasis added).133 This language is repeated almost verbatim
in the UN Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary,134 and the Mt. Scopus International
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Standards.135 This bundling of the two terms throughout these different agreements, and with
the issue unaddressed in international courtrooms, leads to the conclusion that if they are
functionally equivalent.
While one may argue that they are each included separately in these declarations because
the two are different ideas, the fact that they are included in a single series of like concepts,
under the overarching principle of breaches of judicial independence implies both that they can
be read as functional equivalents. This is turn reinforces the idea that the operative framework
for analyzing either political interference or political pressure is that of judicial independence
and when it is breached, rather than the question of political pressures versus political
interference.
ii.

“Perfect” Judicial Independence, free from all extraneous influences, may
not be necessary for the guarantees of international due process under
Furundzija, but appearance of bias is problematic in proceedings and public
perception.

According to the definition expressed in the bevy of international standards created since
1980, judicial independence can be violated under any number of specific circumstances, but the
general principle of freedom from extraneous influences underpins all understanding of the
concept. Specific ideas, such as the admonitions of media to be “fair”136 may differ in each set
of standards promulgated over the years, but certain provisions are universal. In particular, the
freedom to decide “free of any extraneous influences, inducements, pressures, threats or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason”137 is mirrored universally
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across the various standards and resolutions, as are guarantees of independence from threat of
removal or decrease in salary,138 banning of public statements by the executive branch which
may bias the proceedings,139 and equally important, there must be freedom from actual and
apparent appearance of bias by the court.140
Yet none of the international resolutions on the topic state explicitly when these violations of
the independence of the judiciary become a colorable offense before the court which would
allow a defendant to claim his due process rights have been violated. Here, the American legal
tradition provides some guidance, stating that the question is “not whether the judge is actually,
subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or
whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’”141 This does give room for the presence
of some political pressure or political interference before the objective appearance of bias
appears. Although, with the exception of the SCSL in the narrow realm of funding, none of the
hybrid tribunals have actually addressed the question of when judicial independence violations
violate a defendant’s due process rights, the ICTY’s decision in Furundzija provides guidance for
international tribunals generally.
The Furundzija appeal stands for the proposition generally that appearances of partiality
by an arbiter can matter as much as reality. The Test of the Furundzija court,142 that absent
138
See Mt. Scopus Standards, supra note 36, at §§2.8, 3.2, 5.1, 5.3; IBA Minimum Standards, supra note 17 at
paras. 15, 22; U.N. Basic Principles, supra note 21, at para. 11.
139

Mt. Scopus Standards, supra note 36, at §§2.23-2.25 ; IBA Minimum Standards, supra note 17, at para. 16.

140

Mt. Scopus Standards, supra note 36, para. 8.3; IBA Minimum Standards, supra note 17, paras. 44-45; U.N.
Basic Principles, supra note 21, para. 8.
141

Id., at 881.

142

The Court stated the test as:
A. A Judge is not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists.

40

actual bias, there is the unacceptable appearance of bias if “the circumstances would lead a
reasonable observer, properly informed, to reasonably apprehend bias.” Although the Furundzija
decision is not binding on the ECCC, and the rules that the Furundzija court based their ruling
off differs from the internal rules of the ECCC, under Rule 34, many of the same guarantees
apply,143 giving the decision strong precedential value.
Given the scrutiny of international tribunals by NGO’s, media organizations, and donor
and advisor countries, there are many more opportunities to lead a reasonable observer to infer
bias. This gives statements by the executive more prejudicial power than would otherwise be the
case, such as in the East Timor Tribunal and the indictment of General Wiranto, and Prime
Minister Gusmao’s subsequent embrace of the General, or in the IHT with Prime Minister
Maliki’s expectations regarding Mr. Hussein’s impending execution date before the conclusion
of proceedings. Both courts suffered immense criticism for these apparent improprieties, which,
in the IHT’s case, were compounded by the Appellate Chamber’s failure to address the issue.
iii.

Judicial Independence and the ECCC
a.

Allegations of direct executive interference are not analogous to the
IHT judge resignations, but instead reinforce questions of apparent bias.

B. There is an unacceptable appearance of bias if:
i) a Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of a case, or if the
Judge’s decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in which he or she is involved, together with one of
the parties. Under these circumstances, a Judge’s disqualification from the case is automatic; or
ii) the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer, properly informed, to reasonably apprehend bias.
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143

Rule 34(2) States: “Any party may file an application for disqualification of a judge in any case in which the
Judge has a personal or financial interest or concerning which the Judge has, or has had, any association which
objectively might affect his or her impartiality, or objectively give rise to the appearance of bias.” ECCC Internal
Rules, supra note 12, Rule 34(2).

41

The resignations by Judges Blunk and Kasper-Ansermet at the ECCC appear similar to
the resignation and removal of judges in the Al-Dujail trial, particularly drawing parallels to the
resignation of Judge Amin, who resigned under political pressure for his courtroom statements.
Although the analogy is limited, as most of the resignations of the IHT came under the guise of
De-Ba’athification, since here, as in Judge Amin’s case, the two international judges’
resignations are direct responses to executive interference and executive statements that the
judges’ fear could give the appearance of bias in the proceedings, the resignation of judges under
these circumstances may provide further basis for finding that there is bias in the courts among
the remaining judges, much as the resignation of Judge Amin resulted in a perception among
some that the judges left on the IHT would be kept in line.
b.

Statements by Cambodian Government Officials may be enough to
cause an appearance of impropriety under the Furundzija test.

Statements by the government of Cambodia through the Prime Minister, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Information have all given the appearance of influence in the
proceedings of the ECCC. Assuming they do not cause actual bias among the international
jurists, there are two questions: first, whether they cause, or demonstrate, actual bias on the part
of the Cambodian judges. Given the presumption of unbiased judges, however, there may not be
enough evidence to find bias, especially without narrowly tailored allegations. Thus the primary
question shifts to whether these statements give the appearance of bias among either
international or Cambodian jurists to a reasonably informed observer.
Even with the presumption of unbiased judges, this is a reasonable question for a court to
investigate. On one hand, there are the statements themselves, which, in general give a
perception of political pressure on the judiciary, as well as the resignation of international judges
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in response which gives those allegations weight. However, on the other hand, a careful reading
of the statements may give the impression that the judges, rather than kowtowing to pressure of
the statements, of not investigating Case 003 and 004,144 for instance, is proof of resilience, as
the investigations of both have proceeded.
c.

Judicial Interference from the Cambodian co-investigatory judge You
Bunleng may appear improper as a violation of independence among
judicial colleagues, it is most accurately framed as political interference
from the executive.

Both the Mt. Scopus and Bangalore Principles protect judicial integrity from interference
from colleagues, though the two differ slightly. While Section 9.1 of the Mt. Scopus standards
state “a judge must be independent vis-à-vis his judicial colleagues and superiors,”145 echoing the
earlier Bangalore Principles which state “a judge shall be independent of judicial colleagues in
respect of decisions that the judge is obliged to make independently,”146 the allegations affecting the
ECCC are that the Cambodian co-investigatory judge, You Bunleng, obstructed the investigations of
Case 003 and 004, prompting Judge Kasper-Ansermet’s resignation. Unfortunately, none of the
experiences with the ICTY, SCSL, East Timor Tribunal, or IHT provide direct guidance on this point
of collegial interference, and nor do the ECCC Internal Rules expressly address the topic.147
However, if the allegations of the Cambodian co-investigatory judge’s interference are
viewed as stemming from biased behavior, whether originating from an improper link between the
Cambo§§dian government and the judge, or arising from the pressure of statements by government
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officials, the cause of action under the normal procedure of Rule 34(2)148 overlaps with those
discussed above.

d.

ECCC funding mechanism is not likely a violation of Judicial
Independence since the contribution by the Cambodian Government is so
small a percentage of total Tribunal funding.

Unlike in the SCSL, the funding of the ECCC is not likely to be a primary issue, though it
may be raised, especially as the court ages, and international donor states lose interest. Like the
SCSL, the ECCC is supported by voluntary contributions by donor states. This question has
already been addressed by the SCSL in the Norman case, examined above, which concluded that
international donations, even if made on a voluntary basis, do not violate the judicial
independence of the tribunals.
However, unlike in Sierra Leone, it is not the international donors who may be accused of
exerting undue pressure on the Tribunal. The concern is that the Cambodian government itself
will seek to influence the court, and a funding mechanism may be an effective method.
According to the ECCC, at least $6.6 million for the Court has been paid by the Cambodian
Government itself.149 Though the total cost of the tribunal is uncertain, estimated to top $150
Million by the end of 2011,150 to a projected $338 Million,151 in either case, these
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contributions by the government would amount to only between 3% and 1.5% of the total cost of
the Tribunal since its founding.
This low contribution percentage may change, however, as the ECCC may look to the
Cambodian Government for more funding as it ages, potentially raising this issue of
compromised independence from influential funding sources in the future.152 This effect may
compound as allegations of political interference in the tribunal continue to surface causing a
waning of donor interest, which could increase the reliance of the Tribunal on the Cambodian
government for its financing. Thus, at the moment, the ECCC is not susceptible to charges of
interference stemming from its funding mechanism. However, if the ECCC is forced to rely on
the Cambodian Government for more funding in the future, there may be grounds for a challenge
to the independence of the Tribunal
V. CONCLUSION
At its best, political influence on the judiciary can be informative, providing a court with
alternative arguments and rationales for the sides of cases it hears, as with amicus curae briefs; at
its worst, it can diminish expectations of justice, compromise the public’s faith in the rule of law,
and even make a “court an instrumentality of terror,”153 allowing it to be beholden to despotic
regimes and give the color of justice to the unjustifiable.
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This spectrum of political influence presents a valid question of whether pressure must
always amount to interference. International resolutions and jurisprudence shows that it may not,
necessarily, but that especially for the highly public international criminal tribunal system, the
loss of legitimacy from the appearance of impropriety is especially damaging. As Justice Robert
Jackson said during his opening statements at the Nuremberg Trials, “We must never forget that
the record on which we judge these defendants is the record on which history will judge us
tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it to our own lips as well.”154 It
is ultimately history that judges the actions of the tribunals, and it is for history, as much as the
defendants, that judicial independence must be guaranteed.
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